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he Spitzenkandidaten experiment has been at the centre of a heated debate for several 
months. For some, its success – the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as the next 
President of the European Commission – represented the victory of voters and the 
European Parliament against a reluctant European Council; for others, the Spitzenkandidaten 
procedure itself has been little short of a coup d’état against nation-state democracies.1 
However, the reshaping of the legitimacy of the President represents neither the defeat of 
the member states nor the instalment of a European prime minister. The real coup d’état has 
been directed against the old process of appointing the European Commission President 
behind closed doors. Although the new procedure entails “a number of political, 
institutional and ‘thus’ constitutional ambiguities”,2 it has rendered that process more 
transparent, if not more democratic – and will almost certainly endure to the next European 
elections in 2019 and beyond. As a result, the new procedure is likely to trigger important 
changes in Europe’s political parties and elections. 
The new President can now be seen to enjoy a form of popular mandate. It is true that the 
lack of resources, along with the reticence of national media and national political parties, 
made it extremely difficult for citizens to acquaint themselves with the main candidates. 
Nevertheless, the candidates were all chosen by open procedures. The nomination of the 
                                                     
1 See e.g. P. De Matteis, “EU faces prospect of ‘coup d’état by European Council”, The Parliament Magazine, 
5 June 2014 (www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/eu-faces-prospect-coup-d%C3%A9tat-
european-council) and G. Steinhauser, “Broad Majority of Pro-EU Lawmakers Elect Junker to Head 
Commission”, The Wall Street Journal, 15 July 2014 (http://online.wsj.com/articles/broad-majority-of-pro-
eu-lawmakers-elect-juncker-to-head-commission-1405427499). 
2 Y. Bertoncini, “New President, ‘New’ Constitution?”, Tribune: Viewpoint, Notre Europe, Paris, 23 July 
2014. 
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European Peoples Party’s top candidate at the March 2014 Election Congress in Dublin, for 
example, was the product of a transparent, competitive and democratic method in which 
Juncker defeated his French rival, Michel Barnier. Besides, the European Peoples Party 
gained the most seats in the elections and this effectively gave its top candidate “priority in 
trying to gain the backing of a majority of the members of the European Parliament”.3 It is 
hard to argue that the new Commission President does not enjoy a clearer democratic 
mandate than any of his predecessors. More importantly, the new democratic clothes of the 
President are likely to alter the balance within the Commission in his favour: the process of 
presidentialisation within the executive branch of the EU, initiated by the Treaty of Nice, 
will receive a further boost. The approval by the Parliament of a Commission programme 
bearing the mark of the President at the start of the legislature will reinforce his credentials 
considerably.  
However, the new President will not be able to act without the member states: all of his 
colleagues in the college are nominated by them and he is obliged to take account of their 
wishes in the allocation of portfolios. One can observe that many of the nominees to the 
new Commission are political heavyweights who are likely to serve as a counterweight to 
the new President. At the same time, there is something of a paradox in having a more 
transparent method of election of the President going hand-in-hand with the traditional 
system of backroom deals and horse-trading about the names of Commissioners and their 
portfolios. The tension between the two methods will be more thoroughly tested in five 
years, when the Spitzenkandidat may be tempted or even encouraged to present a small 
cabinet of Commissioners in waiting.  
The relationship between the Commission President and the political families in the 
European Parliament has also changed. Having emerged from the interplay between 
European political parties, he is under stronger pressure to promote the kind of policies 
that the main political parties called for during the electoral campaign. However, this 
change should not be considered a revolution either. Even if the President may now be 
considered more than an ‘honest broker’ between different and competing interests in a 
consensual system, we are still far from the parliamentary democracy found in the member 
states. The new President is far less than a ‘European prime minister’. The “competitive 
cooperation”4 between Council and Commission concerning the setting of the political 
agenda will remain as before. Moreover, the new President will continue to depend on the 
broad support of the European Council, and will still occasionally need an absolute 
majority of at least 376 votes in Parliament.  
If both the internal balance of the Commission has not radically changed, and the President 
has not become a new prime minister, where is the real coup d’état? The real change was in 
the process, not in the outcome. Indeed, we can reasonably expect that process to evolve 
further: the European Parliament may take the initiative and choose the candidates from its 
own ranks – or beyond – or the heads of state and government may seek to interfere 
directly in the selection process and promote certain candidates. Whatever the precise 
evolution, the procedure will necessarily be more transparent than the previous horse-
trading behind closed doors in the European Council. In a nutshell, greater transparency 
will definitely be a legacy of the 2014 election; secrecy has been dealt a mortal blow. 
                                                     
3 M. Incerti, “Never mind the Spitzenkandidaten: It’s all about politics”, CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2014, p. 1. 
4 P. Bocquillon and M. Dobbels (2013), “An Elephant on the 13th Floor of the Berlaymont? European 
Council and Commission Relations in Legislative Agenda Setting”, Journal of European Public Policy 21( 1), 
p. 22. 
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The transparency of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure is likely to trigger further changes in 
the organisation and functioning of European political parties and elections. Internal 
competition and political tensions will increase, as the parties are brought increasingly into 
the spotlight from the recesses of Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union. In the 2014 
elections, the lead candidates were largely unknown but in future we can expect to see 
more high-calibre politicians seeking to advance their careers in the European political 
party system. 
Consequently, we could anticipate that national political parties will engage in more 
transnational fora for discussion with parties from other countries. Transnational party 
congresses and summits are likely to play an increasingly important role, not least those 
that precede European Council meetings. Besides, we should watch for a process of 
simplification and uniformity of the systems for the internal selection of candidates. We 
could also see European manifestoes become transnational platforms adopted by each 
member state’s party. It is not too far-fetched perhaps to imagine such European 
manifestoes becoming the pillars of national parties’ manifestoes, rather than the other way 
round.  
Such internal changes, along with the convergence towards more transnational fora for 
discussion, will not be neutral in their effects. They will represent a major challenge to the 
present structure where European parties are little more than federations of national 
parties. Nevertheless, the logic of this year’s change in the process is that the President of 
the Commission would emerge from the choices made by real ‘pan-European parties’, 
thereby serving in turn to “reshape the nature of European elections”.5 The precise shape of 
what emerges remains uncertain but the Spitzenkandidaten experiment has undoubtedly let 
the genie out of the bottle: there is no way to put it back. The process of electing the 
Commission President will never be the same again. 
 
                                                     
5 S. Hobolt, “A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections”, Journal of European Public Policy, 17 July 2014, p. 2 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.941148). 
